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Pakistan’s Crisis of Legitimacy1 
Roger Ballard 
Although Pakistan produces a substantial flow of applicants for refugee status in the UK, 
only a small proportion complain of direct persecution by the State. Instead the vast majority 
seek protection from non-state agents, from whose activities the state offers them an 
insufficiency of protection. Most such claims are consequently lodged either by members of 
religious minorities, or by women.  
On the face of it the Pakistani state – closely supported by the military – has no shortage of 
power with which to back up its authority. However since the very inception of the state in 
1947, the nominal strength of successive regimes has been undermined by the weakness of 
their claims to legitimacy, making them vulnerable to populist pressures whipped up by the 
religious right. The resultant contradictions have become particularly severe in the aftermath 
of the post-9/11 invasion in Afghanistan, such that General/President Musharraf has found 
himself crushed between the competing demands of his sponsors in Washington who keep his 
regime afloat and the ever more intense  anti-American feelings of both the population and of 
the Army which he still heads. With the institutions of civil society in increasing chaos, the 
principle source of external pressure on this house of cards now comes from the ever more 
influential religious right. 
Arguing that they have an inalienable right to supervise an inherently untrustworthy state, 
the fundamentalists  currently preferred targets include 
i. ‘Unbelievers’ – or in other words all those whose interpretations of the tenets of 
Islam differ from their own 
ii. ‘Moral backsliders’ – such as women who have the temerity to disobey their fathers 
and husbands 
Both sets of targets are generating a steady flow of refugees to the UK. All over Pakistan 
local fundamentalists have begun to actively to target such ‘deviants’ on the grounds that 
their activities undermine the integrity of the Islamic order. In doing so, they have begun ever 
more seriously to usurp the administrative powers of the properly-constituted authorities.  
If the authorities had a greater degree of legitimacy they would be in a better position to 
sweep such usurpers to one side. But given the shakiness of the current regime, which above 
all derives from the contradictions around which it has been constructed, any efforts which 
Musharraf makes to do so plays straight into the hands of the religious right – who promptly 
argue that this is evidence of how far his illegitimate regime has succumbed to the efforts of 
the American crusaders to undermine the integrity of Islam and its ummah – just as they are 
alleged to be doing via the Karzai regime in Afghanistan. The resultant process of 
‘Talibanisation’ is currently at least as vigorous on the Pakistani side of the colonially-
constructed Durand line as its counterpart in Afghanistan. At present there is no immediately 
obvious basis on which these developments seem likely to be contained.  
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The roots of the crisis of legitimacy – and indeed of system-failure – currently faced by the 
Pakistani state can be traced right back to its inception when Britain’s Indian Raj reached the 
point of collapse in 1947. At all sorts of levels Pakistan was ill-prepared for its birth. In a 
paradox which still has profound implications to this day, the initial dynamic for its creation 
was much more exogenous than endogenous, for the vast majority of its most enthusiastic 
supporters did not even live in that part of the subcontinent in which Pakistan came into 
being. Instead the loudest demands for its creation came from elsewhere: the Muslims whose 
ancestral roots lay elsewhere in the Indian sub-continent, where their minority status led to 
them becoming acutely fearful of the prospect of unrequited Hindu domination.  
India’s independence and the contradictions precipitated by religious plurality 
The Muslims were not the only Indian minority group with such concerns. The 
subcontinent’s tribal, untouchable and Sikh minorities harboured similar fears, which cut 
across and reinforced other regional and sectarian contradictions in all manner of complicated 
ways. As it became increasingly clear that Britain’s Raj was coming to an end, a crisis 
erupted within the Indian independence movement: what steps should be taken to cope with 
the contradictions arising from India’s many dimensions of regional, linguistic, ethnic and 
religious plurality?  
 
Under the leadership of Gandhi and Nehru, the Indian National Congress adopted a very 
straightforward position: the future Republic of India would not only be homogeneous, but 
strictly secular in character. Religious affiliation – along with all other manifestations of 
diversity – would be a personal and private matter, of no public, institutional or political 
significance.  
 
Few of India’s minorities were convinced that this would offer them much protection in the 
face of hegemonic mobilisation more powerful than themselves. However those who sounded 
the loudest alarm were members of India’s largest and best organised minority, the Muslims, 
who made up close to a quarter of the sub-continent’s population. Even then Muslim voices 
were far from united. The loudest voices of protest did not arise in the peripheral provinces 
where Muslims formed the majority – precisely the areas in which Pakistan eventually 
crystallised. Instead concern for their future was most intense in the heartland of the 
subcontinent, which had largely been subject to Muslim rule in pre-British times, even 
though the Muslims living in these areas were heavily outnumbered by Hindus. 
 
Fearing that the Hindus would want to get their own back, the Muslims of Hindustan were 
extremely sceptical of Nehru and Gandhi’s bland assurances that all would be well when the 
day of Independence dawned. In their view the Hindu majority – who dominated the 
Congress party – were bound to gang up against them the moment the British left. In an effort 
to construct an institutional bulwark to hold that prospect at bay, the Muslim League – led by 
Mohammed Ali Jinnah, an astute lawyer with an even more secular outlook than his Hindu 
counterparts – insisted that independent India should constituted in such a way as to 
guarantee minorities in general, and the Muslim minority in particular, an institutionally 
guaranteed share of power.  
 
Unfortunately Gandhi, Nehru and their supporters refused to have any truck with such 
pluralistic notions. On the grounds that unity was strength, they insisted that independent 
India should be a centralised, secular, and above all an institutionally homogeneous state, 
whose very integrity such Muslim intransigence threatened to undermine.  
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In desperation, Jinnah threatened to wreck the entire party. He argued that if the Hindus were 
not prepared to do a deal, he would insist on dividing India itself through the creation of a 
separate state of Pakistan. Given that Jinnah and the vast majority of Muslim Leaguers were 
resident in Hindustan, this was not what the Qaid-i-Azam and his supporters really wanted at 
all; however he also calculated that it was an outcome which Nehru and Gandhi wanted even 
less. But to his alarm they refused to budge. Brinkmanship got worse and worse, and for 
reasons I have not got time to discuss here, Jinnah ended up with the unwanted fall-back 
position with which he had tried to blackmail his opponents.  
Pakistan: a solution or yet another can of worms? 
But there were many further ironies still to come. When Jinnah gave his inaugural address as 
the newly independent state of Pakistan’s Governor General on 14th August 1947, the vision 
of the future he set forward was one which would have been equally applicable if partition 
had never occurred, and he had been inaugurated has head of state of a united India. His 
position was quite clear: in the new nation which had just been created of its inhabitants’ 
would enjoy equal rights, an equality of esteem, and an equal degree of formal recognition by 
the state.  
 
Jinnah was no Islamist. His concerns were much more political than religious in character. 
Hence whilst his objectives were to challenge – and as it turned out to put himself and his 
followers beyond the reach of – the threat of Hindu domination. Hence whilst the second-best 
solution of Pakistan with which he found himself lumbered might indeed provide a welcome 
place of safety for Muslims seeking refuge from the pogroms which were taking place in 
India, its future – at least as far as Jinnah was concerned – was most emphatically not that of 
an Islamic state.  
 
Nor were the Islamists of the period rooting for such a prospect either. Instead both the 
Deobandis and the followers of Maulana Maudoodi’s Jamaat-i-Islami took the view that the 
concept of a nation-state was antithetical to the principles of Islam. They did so on the 
grounds that a truly Islamic state should not have narrow nationalist foundations, but should 
instead seek to unite all members of the global umma under the authority of a single Khalifa. 
Pakistan, they noted, could only provide shelter for a fraction of India’s – let alone of the 
world’s – Muslims. Nor were they impressed by Jinnah’s credentials as a Muslim leader: his 
liking for Scotch whisky well known, as was the fact that his wife was a Parsee. 
 
If Pakistan’s foundations were shaky in the first place, its immediate development moved 
from bad to worse. Jinnah was seriously ill with TB when the new state came into existence, 
and had passed away within a year. To create the institutional structure for an entire new state 
from scratch would have been a tough enough challenge at the best of times. But in seeking 
to do so Pakistan found itself plagued by precisely the same contradictions of plurality – 
albeit articulated within a rather smaller arena – as those which had precipitated its 
crystallisation in the first place. Moreover given that the Muslim League was an import from 
Hindustan, it had to do so in the absence of any kind of organised civil foundations. 
 
Even though Pakistan became a more or less homogeneously Muslim state after its entire 
Sikh, and the overwhelming majority of its Hindu, population fled to India in the immediate 
aftermath of partition, its population was anything but homogeneous. Muslims may have 
formed the overwhelming majority, but they were divided by sect as between Sunnis, Shi’as 
and Ahmadis, and yet deeply by as between the Bengalis (who formed a clear majority), 
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Punjabis, Sindhis, and Baluch. Moreover the greater part of the elite which crystallised in the  
immediate post-Partition period were not even natives of the new state, but muhajirs – 
refugees – from India.  
 
As a result the start the newly founded state suffered from a crisis of identity – and of its 
legitimacy – right from the outset? Just what was its purpose? And what kinds of bonds of 
loyalty could best hold it together? Notions of nationalism were largely fictitious, since its 
population lacked any kind of ethnic homogeneity. On the contrary it was made up of a 
bunch of distinct and mutually competitive ethnic groups, all deeply suspicious of one 
another’s motives.  What about religion? Given that the circumstances of the new state’s 
origins, Islam was an obvious rallying point for national unity – but for the fact that the 
Prophet’s message has always been interpreted in a variety of differing ways. And far from 
the differing sectarian traditions closing ranks in the aftermath of Independence, they 
exploded into an orgy of competition as each sought to claim the theological high ground 
versus all available rivals. 
 
In these circumstances the only other institution capable of holding the nation together when 
all else failed proved to be the Army, which was in any event as regarded as a vital means of 
keeping India – then as now regarded as Pakistan’s ever-present nemesis – firmly at bay.  
 
Against this background the roots of Pakistan’s current crisis of legitimacy is easy to spell 
out: over the course of the past sixty years neither the Army, nor religion, nor ethnicity nor 
the institutions civil society has succeeded in providing the Pakistani nation, let alone the 
Pakistani state, with a sense of coherence, let alone of legitimacy. To be sure all have had a 
shot at doing so, but in the process of seeking to achieve – or more precisely to impose – such 
a sense of coherence on Pakistan’s ever more fractured social order, each successive regime 
has done little more than to widen the contradictions it set out to resolve.  
A state in search of legitimate foundations 
This is no place to offer you an overview of Pakistan’s 60 years of ever more tumultuous 
development: instead I’m going to focus briefly on the role of the Army as a bastion of the 
state, together with the activities of a series movements whose role is best described as that of 
non-state scourges of each of Pakistan’s successive regimes, be they military or civilian. 
These are the Islamists of religious right whose influence – and/or threat – to the established 
order has grown steadily greater over the years. 
 
But first some history. For the reasons I have already sketched out, democratic rule in 
Pakistan got off to an extremely shaky start. The extent to which the capacity of the 
authorities was crumbing was highlighted by the assassination of Prime Minister Liaqat Ali 
Khan in 1951, followed by riots on the streets of Lahore when inflation shot up in the 
aftermath of a brief period of prosperity during the course of the Korean War. Growing 
popular doubts about the legitimacy of the regime was promptly opportunistically harnessed 
by the religious right, who argued that Pakistan’s troubles stemmed from the presence of an 
enemy within: the numerous members of the Ahmadi sect, led by Sir Zafarullah Khan, 
Pakistan’s internationally respected foreign minister, at the core of the administration. The 
Army eventually had to be called out to suppress demands that the Ahmadi movement should 




The Army was beginning to stir in its barracks as the authority of the civilian regime 
crumbled yet further. In 1958 martial law was declared, Field Marshal Ayub Khan  assumed 
the reins of power, to be replaced by General Yahya Khan took over in 1969. By then an even 
larger contradiction was opening up, that between the east and west wings of Pakistan. 
However the consequences of the manifest necessity of replacing military with civilian rule 
had disastrous consequences as far as Pakistan’s Punjabi, Pathan and muhajir ruling elite was 
concerned: Mujib-ur-Rahman’s Awami League united the Bengali vote, such that he could 
expect to enjoy a working majority in the National Assembly if it ever met. It never did. 
Instead the Army set out to ‘pacify’ Bengal, setting off a civil war in which it dissolved in a 
quagmire of failure. A further partition of the country’s two spatially separated wings ensued, 
in the aftermath of which Zulfikar Ali Bhutto emerged as the civilian President of the western 
rump.  
 
But despite his initial popularity, Bhutto’s regime steadily more autocratic regime also ran 
into legitimacy problems. In an effort to placate his ever-present critics on the religious right, 
and hence to give his regime a greater degree of credibility, Bhutto decided to concede one of 
their most salient demands. He issued the notorious ordinance XX, which declared that the 
followers of Ghulam Ahmed Khan – otherwise known as Ahmadiyyas or Qadianis – did 
indeed stand outside the fold of Islam. Not that the initiative did him much good. The 
legitimacy of his regime continued to slip, and before long he was deposed by the very 
apparently inoffensive general whom he had carefully selected to head the Army. Under Zia-
ul-Haq Pakistan was subjected to another lengthy period of military rule.  
 
From our perspective, however, it is worth noting that Bhutto established two key precedents 
in issuing ordinance XX. In the first place the ordinance was a public acknowledgement of 
the legitimacy of a long-standing demand of those ‘ulema (religious scholars). Identifying 
themselves as the guardian Islamic of orthodoxy, they claimed the right to monitor the 
policies of the state against the yardstick of Islamic Law, and should they find any of these to 
be ‘repugnant to the principles of the shari’a’, to demand that they be abandoned forthwith. 
  
Moreover the specific character of Ordinance XX allowed the ‘ulema of the religious right to 
advance their arguments one step further: it not only confirmed their right to issue edicts of 
takfir, apostasy (a contentious issue in Islamic Law at the best of times), but also to argue that 
that the Pakistani state had accepted that it had a duty to enforce such edicts.  
 
To put all this in context, three further points are worth noting: 
i. The scholars of Islam (the ‘ulema) – who are much better understood as canon 
lawyers than as priests – have long engaged in mutual invective. In doing so they have 
regularly accused their opponents in obscure technical debate not just as mistaken but 
kaffirs – unbelievers.  
ii. There is no religious hierarchy in Islam. Hence whilst it is the duty if the ‘ulema to 
provide fatwa on contentious matters, they have no means of enforcing them. Hence 
just as in the case of counsel’s opinion, its force is only as good as its audience 
believes it to be.  
iii. In an Islamic context the ultimate enforcer of the opinion is not a judge but the Sultan. 
Hence the ruler is the ultimate arbiter of such matters, since he has every right to pick 
and choose as which of the fatwa on offer he is going to accept and enforce. 
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 This state of affairs generated a considerable amount of tension amongst the ‘ulema. Every 
Sultan who sat confidently on his throne invariably took care to appoint some tame darbari 
‘ulema, court lawyers, who could be guaranteed to come up with the right decision. Hence 
whilst the most respected ‘ulema were those who kept well clear of the Sultan and his darbar, 
those who did so were by definition powerless and ill-funded; but by the same token those 
who stayed clear of the darbar came into their own whenever the power, and consequently 
the authority of the Sultan began to slip. 
 
The ‘ulema of the religious right to whom Bhutto turned in an effort to sustain his legitimacy 
were in no sense darbari: nor did they reflect, or even attempt to reflect, a consensus of 
opinion amongst the ‘ulema as a whole. Moreover there is no sign that he turned to them 
because of their righteousness: rather he did so in an effort to placate their capacity to whip 
up popular opinion against convenient scapegoats. Hence by acceding to their demands he 
sought both to curry popular favour, and to undermine the capacity of the religious to 
discredit his regime.  
 
Pakistan’s religious right appear to have learned many lessons from this experience. Well 
aware that they lacked the popular support to have any chance of taking over the institutions, 
and equally conscious that they stood in danger of discrediting themselves by exposing their 
inadequacies as governors if they were to do so, they have taken great care to maintain their 
distance from the state. By carefully sustaining their position as non-state actors, they have 
maintained – and indeed further developed – their capacity to take pot-shots at the state and 
its institutions as and when that seemed appropriate.  
 
Talibanisation: the catastrophic consequences of global developments 
Time is short, so I will jump over how all this played out during the reign of General Zia ul 
Haq, who actively courted the far-right ‘ulema to prop up his policies of Islamisation, as well 
the role which they continued to play during the box-and-cox switches between the 
‘democratic’ regimes headed by Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto during the 1990s. Instead I 
will fast-forward to developments which have taken place during the course of the current 
regime of General/President Pervaiz Musharraf – whose has likewise found himself courting 
the religious right in search of legitimacy. But before doing so another crucial ingredient has 
to be inserted into the pot: Afghanistan. 
 
After the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan to prop up the tottering Najibullah regime, 
Pakistan found itself at the fore-front of a Saudi-supported jihad waged by the Afghan 
mujahadin against the Godless Russians, which simultaneously took the form of a CIA-
supported effort to stop the Communists toppling another domino. Huge quantities of funds 
and armaments to support the freedom-fighters/mujahadin began to flow through Pakistan 
and into Afghanistan. Much of this traffic was facilitated by the ISI, a semi-autonomous unit 
of the Pakistan army, whose officers had their own agenda: firstly to bring Afghanistan under 
de facto Pakistani control, and secondly to reinforce the right-wing fundamentalist forms of 
Islam to which many of them were personally committed. Hence the ISI went out of its way 
to encourage and support the Taliban, and the Deobandi seminaries which produced and 
inspired its ill-educated recruits.  
 
In a further twist in the kaleidoscope precipitated by American efforts revenge the 9/11 
atrocities, General Musharraf found himself facing an irresolvable dilemma. As a result of 
Pakistan’s efforts to maintain military – and nuclear – equality with India, Pakistan had 
become severely indebted. Hence when the Americans indicated that they required Pakistan’s 
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support as they set about driving the Taliban out of Kabul, Musharraf was not in a position to 
demur. But whilst his regime was richly rewarded for its cooperation, he severely 
undermined the legitimacy of his regime in so doing. Hence his carefully stage-managed 
general election designed to give his regime a veneer of legitimacy went severely awry. The 
MMA – a coalition of parties from the religious right – received an unprecedented level of 
support, such that they turned out to hold the balance of power in the National Assembly. 
That suited them very well indeed. Not only were they able to continue to castigate all their 
opponents for their lack of commitment to Islam, but also to ensure that the regime would be 
unable to govern without their support – even if they themselves have carefully avoided 
taking office in the central government.  
Contradictions within Islam itself 
All this has brought some deep-rooted contradictions to a head. Whilst there can be no doubt 
that the neo-fundamentalist ideology of the religious right is becoming steadily more 
influential in contemporary Pakistan, its current success owes much more to failure of the 
institutional structures of the Pakistani state than it does to the intrinsic characteristics of 
Pakistan’s indigenous religious and socio-cultural order. Hence in yet another paradox, the 
ever-increasing influence of neo-fundamentalist forces whose activities have precipitated 
what many commentators describe as the ‘Talibanisation’ of Pakistan are in no sense an 
outcome of the Islamic traditions indigenous to Pakistan.  
Prior to partition, popular Islamic practice was strongly influenced by the Sufi tradition. 
Although the ‘ulema were respected in principle, mystically oriented Pirs were far more 
influential than Mullahs and Maulvis, and the shrines of deceased saints attracted far more 
devotees than mere mosques. However to the neo-fundamentalist reformers of the north 
Indian Deobandi school, together with their close allies, the Wahabis of Saudi Arabia, such 
popular practices are anathema, and deserve to be extirpated from the face of Islam. Hence 
Pakistan is also the site of a much deeper battle: between those whose Islam is a source 
spiritual inspiration, and on that basis a source of guidance and solace as one wends one’s 
way through the trials and tribulations of everyday life – and those who see it as God-given 
set of rules which will enable those who follow them to physically overcome all those whose 
ignorance and unbelief stands in the way of their own confident understandings of God’s 
purposes. How, then, have the proponents of the latter position managed to become so 
influential when the most immediate targets of their religious critique are the ideas and 
practices which lie at the heart of popular culture?  
 
A substantial part of their current influence stems from their success in taking advantage of 
the contextual developments set out above. As a result of the failure of Pakistani state to 
deliver significant benefits to a large part of population, together with the equally manifest 
failure of secular political processes to offer any kind of remedy to those inadequacies has – 
as we have seen – left the field wide open to those offering millenarian solutions. However 
the real key to the neo-fundamentalists’ success is to be found in their educational initiatives.  
As in much of the rest of the Islamic world, the parlous state of disastrously under-funded 
public educational institutions has provided the religious right with a wonderful opportunity 
to roll out be its most effective recruiting sergeant of all: a huge network of maddresseh – 
mostly funded by charitable donations from Saudi and the Gulf – across the length and 
breadth of Pakistan. Given the narrowly ‘Islamic’ content of the curriculum of these religious 
schools, most maddresseh graduates of these complete their education with few marketable 
skills. What most do possess in abundance, however, is a fierce loyalty to the teachings of the 
Deobandi/Wahabi tradition, and an equally strong commitment to the destruction of its 
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enemies. In other words they are ideal – and easily malleable – recruits to the jihadi 
objectives of the canny leadership of the religious right. 
Picking off the enemy  
Pakistan’s growing army of jihadis divide their enemies into two broad classes. Firstly 
Islam’s enemies without, whom they have come to regard as ‘Crusaders’ whose self-
proclaimed war on terror aims to crush their civilization and all its works. Given that the 
Americans fall into that category, as do the Hindus, Deobandi madrasseh produce an endless 
stream of recruits ready and willing to sacrifice their lives as shahid in Afghanistan and 
Kashmir. However their jihad is not just directed at Islam’s internal enemies. From a 
Deobandi/Wahabi perspective the principal reason why the ummah is in such a parlous state 
is that since the demise of the four rightly-guided Caliphs thirteen centuries ago, so-called 
Muslims have become their own worst enemies. By deviating from the straight path of 
righteousness, Muslims have fatally weakened themselves, and hence enabled the enemies to 
prevail. If so it follows that if Islam is return to its divinely destined path, internal reform 
aimed at ridding Islam of its mistaken patterns of unbelief is a necessary prerequisite to 
success in the external jihad against the Americans and the Hindus in which it is currently 
engaged.  
 
Who, then, are Islam’s worst enemies in the eyes of the graduates of Deobandi maddresseh? 
They include, in increasing order of seriousness: 
 
• members of Pakistan’s Christian minority, former sweepers to their Muslim superiors, 
and now stupid blaspheming dupes of Euro-American crusaders who go out of their 
way to support their potential fifth column 
• followers of the false ‘prophet’ Ghulam Ahmed Mirza, who dare to call themselves 
Muslims whilst denying Mohammed’s role as the seal of the Prophets 
• miscreants who follow the Shi’a interpretation of Islam who turned against the 
Prophet’s injunction thirteen centuries ago and are still trying, but failing, to 
undermine those dedicated to following the straight path 
• members of Pakistan’s educated and privileged elite, led by the biggest Dajjal 
(impostor) of all, Pervaiz Musharraf. Although claiming to be Muslims, they are in 
fact nothing more than backsliders who are not so very secretly committed to 
advancing the interests of the crusaders, as is evidenced by their commitment to 
godless notions of immorality such as the ‘liberation’ of women. 
The notion that the established order is rotten to the core, and hence in desperate need of 
moral and theological renewal, is not a novel phenomenon in Islam – or in Christianity.  
Likewise history shows that such millenarian movements gain their greatest degree of 
popular support during periods of turmoil and rank socio-economic injustice.  
 Non-state actors in contemporary Pakistan 
The Islamic millenarian movement with which the Pakistani authorities now find themselves 
confronted has taken several decades to develop its current level of momentum, and there is 
no sign that the current regime has come any nearer to devising a set of responses which 
would to diminish, rather than to exacerbate, its further expansion. Moreover given current 
developments the blame for all this cannot be laid solely at the door of the Pakistani 
authorities. The series of proxy wars that have been waged in Afghanistan during the past 
three decades have not only played straight into the hands of the fundamentalists, but have 
also served to reinforce yet further the gross inequalities in Pakistani socio-economic order, 
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turning the country into just the kind of arena in which millenarian movements can be 
expected to flourish. Precisely because all of Pakistan’s many regimes, whether military or 
civilian, have been plagued by problems of legitimacy, none has yet felt capable of facing up 
to the threatening presence of the religious right: instead all manner of efforts have been 
made to appease them. Perhaps the most disastrous consequences of all this is that control of 
large parts of the curriculum in the state-supported educational system has also been ceded to 
the religious right, such that Islamiyyat – now a compulsory subject at all levels in the system 
– is overwhelming grounded in a Deobandi theological vision.  
 
Hence no matter how much Washington may feel content with its success in recruiting 
Islamabad as a collaborator in its ‘war on terror’, the greater part of the country’s population 
together with significant portions of the army are bitterly hostile to the American (and 
British) presence in Pakistan. The attitudes of jihadi-oriented graduates emanating from 
Pakistan’s innumerable Deobandi maddresseh are therefore by no means wholly out of kilter 
with those of the remainder of their fellow countrymen: they simply stand at the extreme end 
of a broad spectrum of popular opinion.  
 
By no means all the graduates of the Deobandi maddresseh choose to pursue a course of 
jihad, no mater how vigorously their mentors may urge them to do so. But those that do so 
can choose between two options. Some choose the dangerous option of the external jihad, 
and in consequence set off in the direction of Afghanistan and Kashmir. Meanwhile those 
with less courage provide ready recruits for a more localised version of jihad, waged within 
Pakistan’s borders rather than beyond them. In doing so those waging the internal jihad 
operate in a carefully-graded way. Although their ultimate objective is to herd the entire 
population of Pakistan into their narrowly-authoritarian vision of the proper practice of Islam, 
direct attacks on their Barelvi opponents have as yet been relatively rare. Instead the vast 
majority of their full-fronted homicidal assaults are much more carefully targeted, and 
consequently directed at much more obvious deviants: Christians, Ahmadis, Shi'as and ‘fallen 
women’ – as well any free-thinking Western-tainted liberals who have the temerity to go out 
of their way to assist them. By doing so the members of the religious right can present 
themselves as defenders of the purity of Islam against the many dajjals who have dedicated 
themselves to corrupting its integrity.   
Conclusion 
General Pervaiz Musharraf is no fundamentalist: on the contrary there can be little doubt that 
he is broadly liberal-minded in personal terms. But even though he is simultaneously the 
elected President of Pakistan, as well as Chief of Army Staff, he is in no way in a position to 
act as he wills. Instead he is best regarded as standing at the peak of a delicately constructed 
house of cards, in which a significant rebellion by any of its major elements would bring the 
whole edifice tumbling down in chaos. But whilst the contradictions which he has been 
required to bridge to maintain his balancing act have by now comprehensively shredded all 
the claims to legitimacy which his regime may once have had, the absence of any viable 
replacement inhibits all the contradictory elements of which it is composed to bring it down.  
 
This has provided non-state actors on the religious right with an opportunity to have a field 
day. Not that they have any immediate plans for a comprehensive takeover. They are far too 
canny for that. They are well aware that their level of active support amongst the population 
at large is far too limited for such an exercise to have any prospect of success, and that even if 
they did by happenstance manage to do so, they are would by doing so expose themselves to 
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the prospect of being exposed to just the same process of failure and delegitimisation of 
which all previous Pakistani regimes have rapidly fallen foul.  
 
Instead they are carefully maintaining their stance on the sidelines, and doubtless will 
continue to do so when the Musharraf regime reaches its inevitable end, and regardless of 
whether its successor is more military or civilian in character. In strategic terms there is much 
to be said in favour of sustaining their position as non-state actors, since it gives them access 
to power without being troubled by matters of responsibility. Above all it enables them to 
claim the moral high ground by subjecting the state and its institutions to a constant critique 
by claiming that it is failing to live up to its Islamic duties, whilst picking off vulnerable 
‘impostors’, ‘apostates’ and other similar deviants from the straight path as and when they 
will.  
 
So long as this kind of stand-off is sustained, states in Pakistan’s position can be expected to 
produce a steady stream of refugees fleeing from persecution by non-state actors against 
whose depredations the properly constituted authorities are neither able nor willing to offer 
adequate protection.  
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